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ABSTRACT
Sensing and Perception (S&P ) is a crucial component of an autonomous system (such as a robot),
especially when deployed in highly dynamic environments where it is required to react to unexpected
situations. This is particularly true in case of Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) driving on public roads.
However, the current evaluation metrics for perception algorithms are typically designed to measure
their accuracy per se and do not account for their impact on the decision making subsystem(s). This
limitation does not help developers and third party evaluators to answer a critical question: is the
performance of a perception subsystem sufficient for the decision making subsystem to make robust,
safe decisions? In this paper, we propose asimulation-based methodology towards answering this
question. At the same time, we show how to analyze the impact of different kinds of sensing and
perception errors on the behavior of the autonomous system.
1 Introduction
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) are, arguably, going to be the first mass deployment of robots that poses a safety impact
on public spaces such as roads. It is well known that before an autonomous system can be deployed, each component
must pass a set of tests to prove that it is capable of safely achieving its intended purpose. However, the Operational
Design Domain (ODD) [1] of the system may also include situations in which specific components (or subsystems)
tend to exhibit diminished performance which may impact safety. In the case of AVs, this is a major safety concern
when planning for deployment on public roads. For example, an AV may perform acceptably during daylight hours,
but not very well when it gets dark. In such situations, we could intuitively infer that the more fallible component is
not the decision-making process, but rather the perception subsystem, which may not be able to correctly perceive the
surroundings without sufficient lighting thus leading to undesirable AV behavior. On the other hand, we could also
conclude that the decision making process is not robust enough to handle such specific situations [2]. A recent (March
2018) fatal accident of an experimental AV with a jaywalking pedestrian under adverse lighting conditions is a case
in point, as the investigation revealed that the decision making was not robust against realistic perception errors [3].
Evidently, a mereological (part-whole) consideration is required, since neither of the subsystems is adequate or inade-
quate by itself; rather, their combination as a whole is necessary to obtain adequate performance. Therefore, limiting
the performance evaluation to the separate components does not address the issue of estimating whether the system
will be able to operate safely under specific conditions and edge cases. Furthermore, the current metrics designed to
evaluate perception are inadequate to answer a critical question: is the performance of a perception subsystem sufficient
for the decision making subsystem to make robust, safe decisions?
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Figure 1: Simplified architecture of an ADS illustrating how PEMs can help to study the impact of S&P errors on decision
making: (top) Actual ADS as it operates in real world (below) ADS with PEM in virtual world.
Virtual testing of AVs using simulations offers a safe and convenient way to validate safety [4]. However, high-
fidelity models are necessary to achieve meaningful simulation results that represent the real world. In particular,
physics-based sensor simulations can generate synthetic sensor signals to directly challenge the perception; but, they
are highly compute-intensive and deters the real-time execution of virtual tests under full Automated Driving System
(ADS)-in-the-loop or Hardware-in-the-loop configurations. Therefore, it is imperative to develop a feasible alternative
that models the intended functionality together with the errors and uncertainty posed by the S&P subsystem of the
ADS, to facilitate virtual testing.
In this paper, we provide some insights towards answering the aforesaid question and make the following contributions:
• We review the state-of-the-art metrics used to measure the performance of AI-based perception algorithms,
and identify their limitations in the context of decision making for an autonomous navigation task.
• We recommend some novel directions towards building a representative Perception Error Model (PEM ) that
can meaningfully describe the performance of the actual sensing and perception of an autonomous system.
• We describe an experimental setup designed to exploit the potential of PEM in a virtual (simulated) environ-
ment which offers perfect ground truth, by employing PEMs to replace the actual S&P of the autonomous
system architecture. By including PEMs, we gain the flexibility to introduce meaningful and representative
perception errors while eliminating the need to generate any synthetic sensor signals.
• We demonstrate the usefulness of this approach as a tool to analyze how the perception capabilities of the
system can impact the AV behavior, by investigating several representative urban driving scenarios based
on real-life situations. The PEMs considered in the experiments will also highlight the limitations of the
standard evaluation metrics for perception.
2 Decision Making Process
Most autonomous systems can be regarded as discrete-time decision making systems that operate in a continuous-time
physical world. In the context of AVs, we can term this decision making process as the Driving Policy DP [5] that
leads to a physical response, i.e. AV behavior. Although DP can be hand-crafted (based on a rule book), it is tedious
and less robust given the complex environment with “surprises” that the AV is expected to operate in. Therefore, many
systems learn the art of decision-making from data using reinforcement learning [5], introducing new challenges [6].
While generating a robust driving policy for a robot operating in a controlled environment is generally a tractable
problem, this may not be the case for autonomous vehicles operating on public roads that are shared with other traffic
participants including human-driven vehicles and vulnerable road users (such as pedestrians or cyclists). Therefore, it
is very important to ensure that despite the complexity of the ODD, the driving policy is robust enough to generate
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an appropriate AV behavior which is safe as well as comfortable to the passengers in real time. This is arguably a
complex dynamic spatio-temporal optimization problem, wherein the constraints possess high aleatoric as well as
epistemic uncertainty [7]. Therefore, the AV research community (including industry, academia and regulators) tries
to select scenarios to generate appropriate test cases, and relevant safety metrics that are measurable, objective and
robust. Typical safety metrics used include safety clearance distances (between AV and other traffic participants),
maximum and minimum limits on AV speed, acceleration and deceleration and many others. Nevertheless, a simple
and practical metric is the clearance distance, both in temporal and spatial domains.
3 Error Model
The surrounding environment can be summarized by 3 elements: the map, the ego-vehicle localization, and the other
road users or obstacles. In this paper, we focus on the detection of obstacles and other road users. These are described
in the Object Map OM = {o1, . . . , om}, the set of the m perceived objects that the S&P system provides for each
frame by observing the surrounding worldW = {w1, . . . , wn}. The worldW represents the set of n detectable objects
(a.k.a. the Ground Truth). The OM is then analyzed and through the Driving Policy DP , a response R is generated.
To describe each object w ∈ W , we adopt the same notation as for objects o ∈ OM where o = (X,C):
• Pose: the (6-9)DoF pose X of an object o, represented as a vector of 9 parameters (a 3D bounding box),
X =
(
position, rotation, dimensions
)
. (1)
This includes 3 parameters each for position (x, y, z), rotation (yaw, pitch, roll), and dimensions (length, width,
height). Some parameters such as pitch, roll, or height may be dismissed in specific road traffic environments.
• Class: the class C of the object,
C ∈ {V ehicle, Pedestrian}. (2)
Depending on the system, it can vary from a simple distinction between vehicles and pedestrians, to a finer
classification discriminating between cars, bikes, trucks, etc.
• Additional Parameters: vector X can be extended to include any other relevant object parameters such as
velocity, turning indicator status, or age (for pedestrians), based on the system under consideration and C.
In Figure 1, we note RawData = S(W) and OM = P (RawData). We can observe that:
OM = P (S(W)) = S&P (W) =W + E , (3)
where E is the error betweenOM andW . The responseR is what determines the behavior of the vehicle and therefore,
the overall safety and performance of the autonomous system:
R = DP (OM) = DP (W + E). (4)
The task of assembling the OM requires to address both classification and regression problems, and has its roots in
the object detection task in the Computer Vision (CV) field.
3.1 Evaluation Metrics - State of the Art
The error E includes predominantly 4 kinds of error. Let oi be an object perceived corresponding to wj :
• False negative: oi /∈ OM;
• False positive: wj /∈ W;
• Misclassification: Coi 6= Cwj ;
• Parameters errors: Xoi −Xwj 6= 0.
All these kinds of errors can be individually observed, statistically measured, and studied by comparing W and the
OM produced by the S&P . Given Equation 3, the task of analyzing and describing the error is an extension of the
task of measuring the error of a perception subsystem. In fact, many metrics have been developed for the task of object
detection from the CV field. In the field of AVs, many benchmarks on public datasets [8, 9, 10] explore variations of
these metrics.
Intersection over Union (IoU) and Mean Average Precision (mAP) are popular metrics for assessing CV algorithms for
generic object detection tasks [11, 12]. Similarly, Multiple Object Tracking Accuracy (MOTA) and Multiple Object
Tracking Precision (MOTP) are common metrics for tracking evaluation [13]. All of these metrics require an a priori
definition of a threshold in order to discriminate between a true positive and a false positive. For example, in [8] the
authors consider IoU ≥ 0.7 for the correct detection of a car, or IoU ≥ 0.5 for a pedestrian.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the critical issues I1, I2, I3.
I1: Temporal considerations: short vs. long non detection intervals.
I2: Overlap Sensitivity: how sensitive is DP to spatial error?
I3: Relevance of the objects: which ones are active constraints?
3.1.1 Evaluation Metrics - Critical Issues
In the deployment of AI-based systems, it is not rare that accuracy is not necessarily the best metric to measure their
capabilities [14]. While it is not debatable that having a perfect score on accuracy-based metrics is the final goal (i.e.,
the perception perfectly overlaps with the ground truth, implying OM = W), these metrics were not designed to
consider DP . Hence, they do not provide a model that is adequate enough to study Equation 4. This is because the use
of a single metric would hide the specifics of the type of error causing perturbations in the measurement.
In particular, we identify 3 critical areas for analyzing the response R (Figure 2), but are out of the scope of CV
metrics:
• I1: Temporal relevance: if the system is deployed in a highly dynamic environment, the worst-case error
(e.g., losing track of an object for longer intervals) may be more relevant than the average error for same
duration.
• I2: Overlap sensitivity: The spatial error associated to each object is definitely important. However, consid-
ering the bounding box overlap alone may not be sufficient to gauge the quality of the response provided by
DP .
• I3: Relevance of the objects: Generic CV tasks do not usually associate a weight to each object, as the
context may not be considered. However, for an AV in a well-defined ODD, the metrics should judge the
relevance of objects considering the context and dynamics (refer I1).
For a more abstract understanding, we should ask: If the system response R provides the desired outcome, such as
avoiding a collision, does it really matter if theOM had significant errors? E.g., if the AV brakes to avoid a perceived
pedestrian, how much does it matter if the object was actually a cyclist? In this case, how to quantify the relevance of
a specific error? There is no straightforward answer to this, since a major classification error could also cause the AV
to respond in an unacceptable and/or unsafe manner.
3.2 Error Modeling Considerations
To better understand how the error manifests itself and to subsequently analyze the performance of the S&P , we must
first understand the causes of the error.
Positional aspects: Our first observation is that the quality of S&P is influenced by the relative position of w w.r.t.
the ego-vehicle, for 2 reasons [15]:
• Distance: Performance of all sensors degrades at longer distances. E.g, a more distant object will be captured
by fewer pixels by a camera and by fewer LiDAR points.
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• Field of View (FoV): Sensors cover different areas around the ego-vehicle. An object that is positioned in an
area covered by multiple sensors could be detected with greater accuracy than an object located in an area
covered by few, or weaker, sensors.
Parameter inter-dependencies: The second aspect is that the values of any of the object parameters X,C can, by
themselves, affect the error associated with other parameters ofX,C [16]. For example, a larger size of an object makes
it more likely to be seen at greater distances, whereas the object class C may limit the error on the size estimation.
Some parameters are also not described in the OM since they are not directly relevant for DP , such as the color or
the material of the object [15]. For example, dark/non-reflective surfaces or metallic artifacts may degrade the quality
of OM when S is primarily based on LiDAR or Radar respectively.
Temporal aspects: As a third observation, we can consider the temporal aspects of the system, since the DP deals
with a sequence of detections, a dynamical system and environment. The overall error of the system can change over
time, due to shifting light conditions (e.g., sun blinding, shadows), algorithm uncertainties or even any interference
at the level of individual sensors, and should be modeled appropriately. Errors evolve over time and hence should be
viewed as time series and be modeled by dynamical models [17].
3.3 Perception Error Model
In this paper, we propose a Perception Error Model (PEM ) that comprises both the sensing subsystem S and a
perception subsystem P , approximating their function:
PEM(W) ≈ S&P (W) = OM =W + E . (5)
We propose the following abstraction:
PEM = {Φ,Θ,Γ}, (6)
where each component is defined as follows:
• Φ: temporal and statistical description of the perception error in function of X;
• Θ: a zone-based spatial description of the S&P error distribution around the AV considering the coverage by
sensors (as illustrated in Figure 3), addressing the positional aspects, viz., the FoV and Distance problems.
• Γ: a description of environmental conditions affecting the error, e.g., a system deployed on the road can
be conditioned by the light intensity or fog density, which can be modeled as continuous variables in Φ.
Alternatively, one could choose to discretize them and provide distinct Φ for each value (e.g., Φdaylight, Φnight).
3.3.1 Zones-based approach for Θ
As illustrated in Figure 3, we propose to address the positional aspects of error by representing the perception error
in different zones. The FoV problem is easily solved, by dedicating a zone to the overlap of a specific set of sensors.
The distance problem instead is already considered in some CV benchmarks [12, 18]. The common solution is to
discretize the distance in different ranges, breaking down the metrics into different regions. Our zones approach is, in
fact, an extension of that approach; while the zones can also be determined by distance thresholds, we also make the
entire approach sensor-agnostic. Furthermore, we can apply the zones approach to study the contextual relevance of
the objects for a given driving scenario and a planned manoeuvre. Dedicated models for each zone allows to better
understand which are the critical areas of the surroundings.
3.3.2 Key considerations for PEM
If Φ is designed to simply return each object w without any alteration in its parameters, the model is replicating a
perfect S&P system that is able to detect the ground truth. More interestingly, the model can also be designed to not
return objects in specific zones ∈ Θ, thus replicating cases of non-visibility such as blind spots (i.e. the object is not
within the range of any sensor, or is occluded [19]).
Considering the above, we propose that designing a PEM is, without loss of generality, a regression task, where the
goal is to learn the rules and parameters which describe the difference (E) betweenW and the OM generated by the
S&P subsystem (Equation 3), formalized as Φ, Θ, and Γ.
Despite having similarities with a typical procedure for computation of evaluation metrics (i.e. comparing perception
output to the ground truth), this task is more complex. As described in Section 3.2, it involves analyzing influence
of spatio-temporal dependencies, and object-specific parameter inter-dependencies (covariances) which are relatively
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(a) Camera (b) LiDAR (c) Overlap
Figure 3: Example of a zone-based partitioning of the S&P errors. (a) Simple camera FoV, divided into 2 zones based on its range;
(b) LiDAR, with 1 zone; (c) Multiple sensors, leading to an overlap region (or regions) where objects can be detected by both
sensors. The perception error will depend on how the signals are fused.
Figure 4: Screenshot of the co-simulation in a generic urban driving situation. Bounding boxes (yellow/purple) of PEM -based
objects OM rendered by LGSVL (right) are consistent with what Apollo sees (left), even undetected objects.
under-explored fields. Such aspects are mainly conditioned by the choice and configuration of sensors and perception
algorithms. Thus, academic studies focus mostly on a generalized performance evaluation.
To motivate research in this direction, in the next section we focus on showing how a richer and more descriptive
PEM can serve to address some of the issues in the evaluation of both the S&P and DP . Such an evaluation process
is not only crucial from a regulatory perspective, but can also facilitate the system development life-cycle; it can guide
developers in choosing the sensors, training the perception models, as well as identifying weaknesses in the DP .
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(a) Illustration of 2 scenarios in our experiments (TC1-3, TC4-5).
(b) Following another vehicle. (c) Pedestrian on an urban road.
Figure 5: Scenarios used in experiments: (a) a representative illustration, (b,c) instances from the nuScenes dataset [10].
Parameter 
Variations
Scenario
Test case
Perception 
Error Model
Experiment 
sets
Experiment 
runs
Figure 6: Functional relationship between scenarios, parameter variants, test cases and error models in our experiments.
4 Experimental Setup
In this section, we describe the software tools and the experiments conducted to highlight how different kinds of error
do (or do not) affect the response R, thus allowing us to observe how a specific PEM can influence R. Furthermore,
we describe different PEM variants that serve to demonstrate some of the critical issues discussed in the earlier
sections. In this paper, we focus on Φ, i.e., the temporal and statistical description of S&P error, and specific statistics
related to standard evaluation metrics. The experiments we designed require a driving simulator and an ADS. To this
end, we chose open source tools, namely LGSVL simulator [20] and Apollo 3.5 [21]. LGSVL simulator is based on
the Unity Engine and maintains a reliable bridge between Unity framework and the CyberRT middleware relied on in
Apollo 3.5, thus enabling co-simulation (see Figure 4). We developed python scripts to implement different scenarios,
to automate the tests, configure the simulation environment and the actors in a deterministic manner, and to log the
results.
To facilitate our experiments, we adapted these tools so that we could include the PEM in the loop. To this end, we
bypassed the built-in S&P subsystem in Apollo. Firstly, instead of processing (synthetic) raw sensor data, we adapted
Apollo to directly read the OM from a new special-purpose CyberRT topic. Secondly, we defined a new sensor in
LGSVL simulator that upon observingW , generatesOM by applying the specific PEM (see Equation 6) configured
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for the experiment, and then publishes OM on the new CyberRT topic that the decision making part of Apollo could
read from.
4.1 List of Scenario-based Experiments
In order to study the influence of error models on the AV behavior, we generated a set of experiments following the
scheme depicted in Figure 6. In particular, we defined a set of relevant driving scenarios (see Figure 5), configured
their parameter variations to get concrete test cases, and tested them with different PEMs to form actual experiments
that are executed multiple times (at least 30 runs each, to account for randomness involved in our PEMs).
Scenario 1 (Test cases TC1-3): involves an AV driving on a straight road, approaching a traffic vehicle and then
following it until they reach a red traffic light. For each test case, each traffic vehicle was set to drive at one of 3
different average speeds, viz. 7, 10, and 15 m/s. To challenge the DP , we applied PEMs that can correctly detect
an object (oi = wj) but randomly fail to include it in OM for some frames (similar to tracking loss or sporadic
non-detections). This allows us to study the critical issue of temporal relevance (see I1).
Implementation TC1-3: We model the False negative errors by means of Markov chains with two states. We tested
different values of the parameters steady state probability ∈ [0.0, 1.0] and mean sojourn time ∈ (0.0s, 10s] (average
time spent in a state before changing) so as to generate non-detection intervals of varying duration.
Scenario 2 (Test cases TC4-5): this is defined by the presence of a pedestrian in 2 different situations: standing in
the middle of the road, or jaywalking. For these TCs, we applied PEMs that generate different positional errors,
with the intention of studying the impact of critical issue I2.
Implementation TC4, TC5a: Gaussian White Noise with varying standard deviation σ, applied to the relative position
of w w.r.t. the AV, in polar coordinates:
• multiplicative noise on radius d as σd ∈ [0%, 12%];
• additive noise on azimuth θ as σθ ∈ [0◦, 1.5◦].
We then apply additional PEMs to TC5, so as to replicate the failures that led to a recent AV accident [3].
Implementation TC5b: Perfect detection at each frame, but with a tracking loss probability ptl ∈ [0, 1] for the
previously detected obstacles. This can result in considering the current detection as a new obstacle, which can hinder
the computation of obstacle velocity and lead to unsafe behavior.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we show the scope of analysis afforded by our experimental setup. Our analysis focuses on the behavior
of AVs in particular, although the methodology can also be applied elsewhere. For ease of understanding, we show
several representative examples from our experimentation. These examples serve to demonstrate the effectiveness of
our approach in analyzing how the PEMs can impact the behavior, and thereby taking simple safety metrics under
consideration.
5.1 TC1-3: Following a traffic vehicle
In Figures 7a, 7b, 7f, 7g, we plot the relationship between two metrics for behavior evaluation, namely minimum
spatial distance (m) and minimum temporal distance (s), and two statistics of the perception error, namely, relative
frequency of detection (realization of the steady state probability) and maximum non-detection interval (realization
of the mean sojourn time). In Figure 7c, we can observe that the success rate (no collision) is increasing with the
increase of the relative detection frequency. However, this is true up to a threshold of ∼ 75%, above which the
success rate is stationary. On the other hand, in Figure 7h, the duration of the non-detection intervals has a much
more significant impact on the success rate. Hence, we can observe that even in a situation of low visibility (i.e.
low detection probability), if the intervals of non-detection are short enough, it is possible for the vehicle to avoid
a collision. This highlights the importance of including the temporal aspects of the error (critical issue I1) into the
perception evaluation.
5.2 TC4-5: Pedestrian on an urban road
The second scenario offers a different insight. As illustrated in Figures 7d and 7i, we cannot observe major differences
in safe behavior (minimum spatial clearance) under varying positional errors generated by different PEMs including
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Figure 7: Relationship between safety evaluation metrics and some specific statistics under varying PEMs. These density scatter
plots summarize all the runs of the relevant experiments, for specific test cases. Given the high number of samples (simulation
runs), we highlighted the densest areas on a color scale from blue (low density) to yellow (high density).
the ground truth. This indicates that the system failure is not due to the PEM , but rather due to a weakness in the DP
of the ADS in our experimental configuration, which is unable to robustly handle TC4. In fact, safety metrics in TC4
are not influenced by the magnitude of the positional error, since the system fails even with low/no errors. Similarly,
in TC5a, the safety is not jeopardized by the error magnitude. This also relates to the other two critical issues I2 and
I3 of the current evaluation metrics. Since a positional error by itself can still allow a safe response, it is not adequate
to consider IoU as a metric for True Positive. On the contrary, a less restrictive metric should be considered, such as a
distance threshold as proposed in [10].
In Figure 8 we compare PEMs with different positional errors in TC5a. Here also, the error magnitude does not have
a major impact on safety, although smaller errors can lead to a more consistent AV behavior. Furthermore, experiments
for TC5b highlight how the safety decreases as ptl increases, as shown in Figures 7e and 7j. As ptl approaches 0.5
and the obstacle velocity cannot be estimated, DP is unable to predict the obstacle’s trajectory and does not brake
to avoid it, similar to the AV accident [3]. This is in contrast to the findings in TC1-3, where frequent tracking errors
were easier to handle than infrequent ones. However, it provides an interesting insight towards understanding the
contextual relevance of error types depending on the scenario. In particular, in TC1-3 the obstacle is always in the
path of the AV, while in cases such as TC5b their paths cross during the scenario (jaywalking in TC5b, but may be
similarly applicable for a cut-in scenario). In the latter case, proper obstacle trajectory prediction is critical to foresee
the imminent collision.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have described an approach to test and study perception errors in a virtual environment, by linking the
respective performance of S&P and DP , and thereby enabling the identification of weaknesses in these subsystems.
Furthermore, we have implemented an experimental setup to test handcrafted PEMs with the aim of highlighting
some limitations of the currently used evaluation metrics for perception algorithms, while discussing how to analyze
the resulting system behavior. Although our focus is on AVs, we believe that our approach is general enough to be
applied to other domains involving navigational tasks and produce similar insights.
The main limitation of the current work lies in our focus on the detection of other road users. Nevertheless, this is a key
challenging problem hindering AV deployments, especially under adverse environmental conditions that degrade the
S&P capabilities. In the near future, we aim to further explore the study of PEMs, develop more realistic simulations
that incorporate perception errors, investigate the robustness of S&P under different environmental conditions, and
finally, better approaches to test weaknesses of DP .
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Figure 8: Illustration of ego-vehicle behavior for TC5a with two PEMs: low σd, σθ (left), and high σd, σθ (right).
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